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THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE:  
SOVEREIGN SEAWAY  
OR INTERNATIONAL STRAIT?  
A REASSESSMENT OF THE LEGAL STATUS
GILLIAN MACNEIL†   
ABSTRACT
The status of the Northwest Passage has been the subject of 
disagreement for at least 30 years. The debate has gained new urgency 
recently as evidence suggests that the warming trends associated with 
climate change are causing a reduction in Arctic sea ice. The practical 
consequence of those physical changes is that the formerly ice choked 
waters of the Northwest Passage might become an attractive route to 
commercial shippers as early as 2050.
The debate surrounding the status of the Passage is relatively narrow. 
At issue is the degree of control which the coastal state, Canada, 
has over the waters of the seaway. The Canadian position is that the 
Northwest Passage forms part of its historical internal waters and, as 
such, Canada has the right to exercise full sovereignty over the Passage. 
These sovereign rights mean that Canada is the only country with the 
automatic right to use the Passage. By contrast, potential user states, 
including the United States, have argued that the Northwest Passage is 
an international strait and that foreign ships enjoy navigational rights 
in those waters. 
The debate between the coastal states and potential user states has been 
framed as a legal question and is therefore suited to a legal examination. 
An analysis of the dispute, placing the positions of the parties against 
customary law of the sea and the provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, indicates that both arguments suffer 
weaknesses. 
† Gillian MacNeil is a 3rd year student at Dalhousie Law School.
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While the parties’ words indicate that they may be at potentially 
irreconcilable odds, a review of state practice suggests the development 
of an Arctic regime, which is responsive to the needs of the coastal state 
and the requirements of user states, is currently underway.
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INTRODUCTION
The status of the waters of the Canadian Arctic in general, and the North-
west Passage in particular, is a matter which is again receiving attention 
in  the  fields  of  international  relations  and  international  law.  At  issue  is  
the degree of control that Canada, the coastal state, is entitled to exert 
over the waters off the northern mainland and island coasts. Driven by 
the impact of climate change, which could result in the Passage being 
used for commercial shipping in the near future, the changing physi-
cal reality is setting the needs of the coastal state against the require-
ments of potential user states who want access to the Passage to be as 
unrestricted by laws as possible. Canada has claimed the Arctic waters, 
including the Northwest Passage as part of its historical internal waters 
but, this claim has been the subject of protest by other states. The most 
significant  party  to  the  dispute  with  Canada,  as  a  result  of  proximity  and  
power, is the United States. American leaders believe that their own se-
curity and sovereignty are best assured by the ability to freely navigate 
their ships anywhere they might be required. As such, the United States 
asserts that the Northwest Passage is an international strait subject to 
a regime of transit rights. The dispute between Canada and the United 
States is framed in legal terms and is thus subject to any uncertainties 
which are found in international law.
 This paper is an effort to assess the current Canadian and American 
positions against the modern customary and conventional law of the sea, 
and  demonstrates  that  there  are  difficulties  with  the  arguments  made  by  
both states. It will begin with an exploration of why the status of the 
Arctic seems to be increasing in importance. This will be followed by 
an exploration of the strength of the Canadian and the American legal 
arguments on the status of the Arctic waters in general, and the special 
situation of the Northwest Passage. As weaknesses are found in both 
arguments, the analysis continues by looking at the current practice in 
the Canadian Arctic, and asking whether a regime different from those 
asserted by the parties is taking shape. This examination of current prac-
tice concludes that, rather than conforming to either of the two catego-
ries put forward by the parties, there is instead a unique Arctic regime 
developing. As a judicial solution to the question of the Northwest Pas-
sage seems unlikely, the contours of this emerging Arctic regime, and 
the  question  of  how  it  might  be  preserved,  are  addressed  in  the  final  part  
of this essay. 
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I. THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF THE ARCTIC 
The increased interest in the Northwest Passage over the last few years 
is a direct result of the impact of climate change on the Arctic. Much 
of the current interest in the Arctic arises from concerns about climate 
change.1 Warming trends in the northern regions of North America, and 
Northern and Central Asia exceed the global model by as much as 40%.2 
However, some view the general warming of the Arctic and attendant 
retreat of the polar ice pack as positive. In particular, the reduction of 
the ice pack has sparked renewed interest in the Arctic as the locus of 
potential shipping routes.3 In terms of the Canadian Arctic, one author 
observed that, “‘[g]lobal warming’ suggests positive impacts for Cana-
dian shipping[…]”4  A “viable” alternative to the Panama Canal would 
be considered by some as a positive development for the shipping in-
dustry.5 In addition to commercial shipping, the general warming of the 
Arctic has sparked renewed interest in exploring the area for energy 
resources6 further increasing the likelihood of a rise in Arctic shipping.7 
Essentially, the shift in the conditions of the Arctic due to climate change 
is sparking positive economic interest in the region.
This renewed interest is provoking a sense that it is necessary to set-
tle the status of the Northwest Passage. To date, there has been no real 
need  to  make  a  final  determination  of  rights  in  and  over  the  Northwest  
1  Douglas M. Johnston, “The Future of the Arctic Ocean: Competing Domains of 
International Public Policy” (2003) 17 Ocean Y.Bk. 596 at 597.
2  Carl Anderson, “Global Warming and Canada’s Shipping Lanes: An 
Oceanographer’s View” (2003) 17 Ocean Y.Bk. 563 at 575-576.
3  Lawson Brigham and Ben Ellis, eds., Arctic Marine Transport Workshop 
(Anchorage: Northern Printing, 2004) 2 [Arctic Marine Transport Workshop]. Arctic 
Marine  Transport,  online:    <http://www.arctic.gov/files/AMTW_book.pdf>.  
4  Anderson, supra, note 2 at 563.
5  Rob Annandale, “Clear Sailing in the North?” MacLean’s (October 3, 
2005) MacLeans, online: <http://www.macleans.ca/topstories/canada/article.
jsp?content=20051003_113126_113126>
6  Paul Reynolds, “The Arctic’s new gold rush” BBC News (October 25, 2005), BBC, 
online:  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4354036.stm>.  Rob  Huebert,  “The  Law  
of  the  Sea  and  the  Arctic:  An  Unfulfilled  Legacy  “   
[An  Unfulfilled  Legacy]  (2004)  18  Ocean Y.Bk.  193  at  198.
7  Rob Huebert, “Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest 
Passage”  [Climate  Change]  (2004)  Isuma  86  at  88.
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Passage.8 In large part, the lack of urgency can be attributed to the fact 
that the Northwest Passage has seen very little use largely due to the 
heavy multi year ice which clogs the Passage and complicates naviga-
tion.9 Additionally, it is assumed that any challenge to the Canadian 
position on the Northwest Passage will come from the United States.10 
Since  1988,  the  Canada-­United  States  relationship  over  the  Passage  has  
been governed by an Executive Agreement (the impact of which will 
be examined below), which permits American icebreakers to transit the 
Passage, provided Canada gives prior consent.11 The combination of 
difficult  navigation  and  an  Executive  Agreement  means  that  neither  the  
United States nor Canada has an incentive to reopen the debate.12 As 
long as commercial transits of the Northwest Passage are unlikely, the 
disagreement is allowed to remain, as one commentator characterized it, 
“politely dormant.”13
However, the general warming trends have already begun to have 
an impact on shipping in the waters off Canada’s north and surrounding 
the Arctic Archipelago. This makes it impossible to ignore the contested 
status  of  the  Passage  any  longer.  In  the  2000,  five  ships  arrived  a  week  
early in Iqaluit in order to have a chance at navigating the Passage and 
the Canadian Coast Guard was providing escort services into the second 
week of November, two weeks later than usual.14  It  is  difficult  to  obtain  
precise information on ice conditions in the Northwest Passage the Ca-
nadian Ice Service does admit that the amount of ice in the Canadian 
Arctic is declining, and predicts that there could be ice free summers 
8    Ibid 90.
9  Humphrey Melling, “Sea Ice of the Northern Canadian Arctic Archipelago” (2002) 
107 Journal of Geophysical Research 2 at 2-1. Journal of Geophysical Research, 
online:  <http://www.agu.org/journals/jc/jc0211/2001JC001101/2001JC001101.pdf>,  
Huebert,  “An  Unfulfilled  Legacy”  supra, note 6 at 203.
10  Rob Huebert, “The Shipping News Part II: How Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty is 
on  Thinning  Ice”  [The  Shipping  News  Part  II]  (2003)  58  Int’l  J.  295  at  305.
11   Can.  T.S.  1988  No.  29.
12   Huebert, “Climate Change” supra, note 7 at 91.
13  Alanna Mitchell, “The Northwest Passage Thawed” The Globe and Mail 
(February 5, 2000) A9. Globe and Mail, online: <http://www.carc.org/whatsnew/
writings/amitchell.html>  at  5.
14  Ibid 4.
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as early as 2050.15 For example the model used for the Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment was described as being “too coarse” to be applicable 
to the rather narrow straits and passages which make up the Northwest 
Passage.16  In  spite  of  this,  officials  have  stated  that  the  possibility  of  ice-­
free seasons in 20-30 years has yet to spark any commercial interest. As 
such, they are focused on developing shipping in the Canadian Arctic 
to meet regional needs, and not to promote the Northwest Passage as a 
potential alternative to the Panama Canal.17 
This narrow focus on developing the Passage for regional use, and 
taking no steps to encourage or facilitate large scale commercial use of 
the Northwest Passage, can be seen as a logical extension of the Cana-
dian position that the waters of the Passage are internal. If the waters of 
the Northwest Passage are internal, then Canada, as the coastal state, is 
the only country with automatic rights to navigate the Northwest Pas-
sage.  The  difficulty  is  that  the  melting  brought  about  by  climate  change,  
and the renewed interest in commercial use of the Passage, is raising 
the possibility of serious new challenges to Canada’s position that the 
Arctic waters between the Canadian mainland and the northern edge of 
the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are internal.18 This clash of asserted 
rights, combined with the likely challenge by user states, is injecting a 
sense of urgency into discussions of the Northwest Passage. As a result 
of  the  potential  of  this  challenge,  it  is  necessary  to  define  and  assess  the  
positions of the disputing parties and to determine whether those posi-
tions are supportable when the law (contained in both customary law 
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)) 
is applied to the geographic and historic conditions of the area.
15  Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, supra, note 3 at 5.
16  Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, supra, note 3 at A-27.
17  Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, supra, note 3 at 5. It should be noted that this 
statement is at odds with an assessment of interest made in 2000 by André Maillet, 
currently the superintendent of the Canadian Coast Guard’s ice operations, maritime 
region, who stated that industry was picking up quickly on the possibility of using 
the Northwest Passage, Mitchell supra, note 13 at 4-5.
18   In general see; Michael Byers and Suzanne Lalonde, “Our Arctic Sovereignty is 
on Thin Ice” The Globe and Mail (August 1st, 2005) Globe and Mail, online: <http:/
www.arcticnet-ulaval.ca/index.php?fa=News.showNews&home=4menu=55&sub=1
&id=77>  [Arcticnet].
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II. THE CANADIAN CLAIM: AN OVERVIEW 
The Canadian position on the Northwest Passage is subsumed by a larger 
claim to sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago 
in general. The Canadian position was most clearly stated by then Sec-
retary  of  State,  Joe  Clark  in  the  House  of  Commons  in  1985.  He  asserted  
that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago were historical inter-
nal waters.19 In order to strengthen that claim, Joe Clark announced the 
establishment of a series of straight baselines which would take effect 
on January 1st,  1986.20 These would enclose the waters of the Canadian 
Arctic,  reinforcing  the  Canadian  claim.  Since  1985,  the  Department  of  
Foreign Affairs has not issued any new statements on the Canadian po-
sition and,21  there  have  been  no  official  statements  which  contradict  the  
1985  assertion  that  the  waters  are  historical  internal  waters.  To  the  con-
trary,  various  statements  made  recently  have  served  to  confirm  that  the  
view  of  Canadian  officials  remains  unchanged.
In 2000, a document entitled The Northern Dimension of Canada’s 
Foreign Policy, established Canada’s goals regarding the North. The 
first  two  objectives  articulated  in  this  paper  were:  
1. To enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians, especially 
northerners and Aboriginal peoples;
2. To assert and ensure the preservation of Canada’s sovereignty in 
the North.
More recently, the Defence section of Canada’s International Policy 
Statement asserted that a key aspect of domestic defence by the Cana-
dian Forces will be to, “increase their efforts to ensure the sovereignty 
and security of our territory, airspace and maritime approaches, includ-
ing the Arctic.”22 This statement was supported by positive action when 
the Department of National Defence announced the commencement of 
Project Polar Epsilon on June 2, 2005. Project Polar Epsilon is a, “Joint 
19  House of Commons Debates,  (September  10,  1985)  at  6463  (Hon.  Joe  Clark).
20   S.O.R./85-­872.
21  Huebert, “Climate Change” supra  note  7  at  88.
22  Department of National Defence, A  Role  of  Pride  and  Influence  in  the  World:   
Defence (Ottawa, 2005) 17. DND, online: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps/
pdf/dps_e.pdf>.
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Space-Based wide area surveillance and support capability that will 
provide all-weather, day/night observation of Canada’s Arctic region 
and its ocean approaches.”23 The project will use data obtained from the 
satellite, Radarsat-II, which is scheduled for launch in 2006.24 
The contention that the waters of the Arctic are subject to Canadian 
sovereignty has also come from sources outside the federal government. 
A discussion paper developed by the governments of Canada’s Northern 
territories state that those three governments, “share […] objectives with 
respect to sovereignty and security in the North: (1) Building northern 
capacity to enhance Canada’s ability to assert its sovereignty in the Arc-
tic.”25 
Military  officials  have  also  made  strong  statements  regarding  Cana-
dian Arctic sovereignty. During a 2005 sovereignty exercise in the Arc-
tic, Commodore Bob Blakely of the Royal Canadian Navy stated that:
This is a demonstration of Canada’s will to exercise sovereignty 
over our own back yard […].The sea is a highway that’s open to 
everyone. We will allow everybody passage as long as they ask for 
our consent and comply with our rules: ‘use our resources wisely 
and don’t pollute the fragile northern ecosystem. 26 
After an episode in 2000 where a submarine was spotted in the Cum-
berland Sound, Colonel LeBlanc, Canada’s military commander in Yel-
lowknife, stated that the act was a violation of Canadian sovereignty 
which could have been taken as a covert operation of war and, had his 
23  Department of National Defence News Release, “Project Polar Epsilon Will 
Enhance Canada’s Surveillance and Security Capability” (June 2, 2005) DND, 
online:    <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1674>.
24  Kristina Davis, “Project Polar Epsilon: Canada’s security and surveillance 
enhancement” (July 13, 2005) DND, online: <http:www.forces.gc.ca/site/
community/mapleleaf/vol_8/vol8_26/826_07.pdf>.
25  Governments of Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut, Developing a New 
Framework for Sovereignty and Security in the North (2005) at 2. Government 
of  Yukon,  NWT  and  Nunavut,  online:  <http://www.gov.yk.ca/news/2005/files/
sovereignty_and_security_in_the_north.pdf>
26   Francis  Harris,  “Canada  flexes  its  muscles  in  dispute  over  Arctic  Wastes”  Daily 
Telegraph (August 22, 2005) Daily Telegraph, online: <http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/08/22/wcan22&sSheet=/news/2005/08/22/
ixworld.html>.  
212 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
soldiers spotted the submarine, they would have forced it to the surface 
or, possibly, attacked it.27 
In 2004, the Canadian Executive, including Head of the Canadian 
Government  and  the  Head  of  State,  confirmed  Canadian  claims  to  sov-
ereignty. During a visit to Nunavut, former Prime Minister Martin made 
comments regarding Canadian Arctic sovereignty.28 This was followed 
by the promise during the October 2004 Speech from the Throne to 
create a comprehensive Northern Strategy in partnership with, “territo-
rial partners, Aboriginal people and other northern residents.” Part the 
strategy is to “protect the northern environment and Canada’s sover-
eignty and security…”29 Finally, in reply to the Speech from the Throne, 
former Prime Minister Martin in the House of Commons stated:
Let me speak here of a region of particular challenge and remarkable 
opportunity, our far north…The North is a land of mystic grandeur, 
of mountains rising through the clouds, of valleys carved deep by 
glaciers, of icebergs shaped by wind and wave. […] As a government, 
we will work with the territories, their governments and aboriginal 
groups to further develop the economy of the north. We will do so 
in  a  way   that  will   sustain   the  environment  and  benefit   the  people  
[…].  Let there be no doubt, we will protect Canada’s sovereignty 
in the Arctic.30 
The survey indicates is that, from the highest levels of the federal 
government through territorial leaders, to military leaders, Canadians in 
positions of power today consider the waters of the Arctic Archipelago 
to be subject to full Canadian sovereignty, or to use the legal term, in-
ternal waters.31 
27  Mitchell supra note 13 at 6.
28    Arcticnet, supra,  note  18.  Canadian  Press,  “Martin  Reaffirms  Canada’s 
Sovereignty over North” CTV News (Aug. 11, 2004) CTV, online: <http://www.
ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20040811/Martin_North_040811?s_
name=&no_ads=>  [Canadian  Press].
29  House of Commons Debates, 002 (October 5, 2004) at 9 (Rt. Hon. Adrienne 
Clarkson).
30  House of Commons Debates, 003 (October 6, 2004) at 45 (Hon. Paul Martin).
31  As will be discussed in the text, at customary law, internal waters were subject to 
the full sovereignty of a state. It is to this which Canada refers in its claims over the 
Arctic  waters.  Article  8  of  UNCLOS  also  uses  the  term  “internal  waters”  to  describe  
the waters enclosed by straight baselines however, the legal rights over such waters, 
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However, these more recent assertions of sovereignty can be viewed 
as problematic. All the statements assert Canadian sovereignty over the 
Arctic but none reiterate that the basis of that sovereignty is historic 
title,  nor  are  the  words  “internal  waters”  specifically  used.  Does  this  in-
dicate an alteration in the Canadian position? Since the establishment of 
straight baselines around the Arctic had the effect of making the waters 
internal regardless of any previous status,32 the question must be asked: 
are subsequent assertions to sovereignty based on historic title, or do 
they only refer to the effect of the baselines on the status of the waters? 
This  question   is   important,  as  Article  8(2)  of  UNCLOS  provides   that  
where waters are made internal by means of baselines, a right of in-
nocent passage exists. Otherwise, according to Article 2 of UNCLOS, 
internal waters are considered to be part of the sovereign territory of 
a state, and are thus subject to the full range of jurisdictional powers 
which a state may exercise on its land territory. It is submitted that, re-
gardless of the failure to re-articulate the basis of the Canadian claims, 
there has been no change in the Canadian position. 
III. RESOLVING THE INCONSISTENCIES 
Since  at  least  1985,  it  has  been  understood  that  Canada  views  the  waters  
of the Arctic Archipelago as internal waters and that historic title is the 
basis of that claim. Given Clark’s statement of sovereignty in the House 
of Commons, any subsequent statement should be viewed as merely 
an  affirmation  of  that  position.  As  long  as  it  is  understood  that  Canada  
claims the waters as internal and that the claim is made on the grounds 
of  historic  title,  there  should  be  no  need  to  reaffirm  that  the  waters  are  
internal as well as sovereign, or that the claim is based on historic title 
with every renewed statement of sovereignty. One would only expect 
reference to the status of the waters as internal, or the grounds support-
as will be seen, are only those rights which may be exercised over the territorial sea 
of a state.
32  Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 
116. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  (UNCLOS),  1833  U.N.T.S.  
3,  art.  8.  UNCLOS,  online:  <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreememts/
convention_overview_convention.htm>.
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ing those statements of sovereignty, if the position of Canadian leaders 
had changed. 
Given the lack of statements regarding any alteration of the Canadi-
an position, and the fact that recent assertions of Canadian sovereignty 
have  come  from  high  level  officials  who  could  make  authoritative  state-
ments regarding changes to the Canadian claims, it is logical to con-
clude  that  the  Canadian  position  has  not  altered  since  1985.  Further  sup-
porting this conclusion is the use of the word “sovereignty.” If Canadian 
claims were based simply on a legal reality resulting from baselines, one 
would expect the claim made to be that Canada enjoys Arctic “jurisdic-
tion” or “authority.” “Sovereignty” is a far stronger term and indicates a 
more possessive and personal claim. In short, Canada views the waters 
of the Arctic Archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, as internal 
waters by reason of historic title. 
A second problem which may arise from the more recent statements 
of sovereignty needs to be addressed. Some of those statements, for 
instance the Speech from the Throne;33 do not refer to the waters of 
the  Arctic   specifically,  only   to  Arctic   sovereignty  generally.  Or,  more  
problematically, in one of former Prime Minister Martin’s statements, 
specific  reference  is  made  to  the  land,  and  not  the  waters.34 Does this 
lack  of  specific  reference  to  Arctic  waters  represent  an  abandonment  of  
claims to Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic waters in general and the 
Northwest Passage in particular? The answer to this question is no.
The dispute over rights in the Northwest Passage is part of a larger 
challenge to Canadian Arctic sovereignty. It is widely known that Canada 
claims sovereign rights over the Passage.35 It is also widely known that 
Canada is party to other disputes regarding Arctic territory; for exam-
ple are the dispute with Denmark over which nation has claim to Hans 
Island, the dispute with the United States over the boundary delimita-
tion of the Beaufort Sea and the Continental Shelf delimitation of the 
Arctic, which involves Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia (among 
others).36 Each of these disputes represents a threat to Canadian Arctic 
33  Supra note 29.
34  Canadian Press, supra  note  28.
35  For articles providing evidence of this notoriety see Francis Harris, supra note 26 
and Paul Reynolds, supra note 6.
36  Harris, supra note 26 and Reynolds, supra note 6. See also the Russian 
submission to the Commission on the Continental Shelf as well as the replies of 
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sovereignty.  If tested in a court, there would be a strong evidentiary 
basis had Canadian leaders enumerated each threat to which their com-
ments referred.  However, as a practical matter it must be remembered 
that failure to enumerate every threat to which the comments might re-
fer  does  not  amount  to  a  denial  of  any  specific  challenges  to  Canada’s  
Arctic sovereignty. Realistically, given the particular forum in which 
the comments have been made, and the number of potential threats to 
which  they  refer,  one  would  only  expect  references  to  specific  aspects  
of the dispute when Canadian leaders are in fact referring to a particular 
instance of the larger sovereignty challenge.
The  question  remains  whether  a  specific  reference  to  Arctic  sover-
eignty may override a more general assertion of sovereignty. For ex-
ample, former Prime Minister Martin’s reference to sovereignty over 
Arctic land during his trip to Nunavut.37 Again the answer is no. Mak-
ing  reference  to  specific  sovereignty  concerns  is  not  inconsistent  with,  
and  can  not  override,  more  general  statements.  In  defining  the  Canadian  
position, the issue is not the form which assertions of sovereignty have 
taken; the issue is whether sovereignty has been continuously asserted. 
To divide each statement of sovereignty from the whole context of the 
current sovereignty challenge and examine it in isolation is counter-pro-
ductive. The important point is that each individual statement of sover-
eignty is not, in fact, an individual statement. Every word and act is part 
of the larger framework of Canadian claims to sovereignty in the Arctic 
and, each word and act should be viewed as a part of that greater whole. 
It is the cumulative effect of the statements and acts which articulate 
the Canadian position; that position is that Canada has historic title to 
the waters north of the Canadian mainland and that title extends to sov-
ereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago which in-
clude the Northwest Passage.
IV. THE AMERICAN POSITION 
In contrast to the general Canadian position that all the waters of the 
Archipelago are internal Canadian waters, the American claim focuses 
interested governments, including Canada. These documents are available at <http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm>.
37  Canadian Press, supra  note  28.
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specifically  on  the  waters  of  the  Northwest  Passage.  The  Americans  as-
sert that the waters of the Northwest Passage form an international strait 
and are subject to a regime of transit rights.38 Transit passage, as de-
scribed in Part III of UNCLOS, means that foreign ships enjoy freedom 
of  navigation  in  international  straits  subject  to  the  specific  limitations  of  
Part III.39 Those limitations, found largely in Articles 39-42, generally 
require that ships conform to internationally accepted standards, and not 
to any more stringent laws enacted by the coastal state.40 
V. REASSESSMENT: WHY NOW? 
Articulating  the  positions  of  the  parties  is,  however,  only  the  first  and  
easiest  step.  It   is  simple  enough  for  Canadian  officials  to  make  asser-
tions of Arctic sovereignty generally and to state that the waters of the 
Northwest  Passage  are  internal  waters  specifically,  or  for  the  Americans  
to claim that the Passage is an international strait; it is another matter to 
prove that either contention is true. No state has yet found it necessary 
to formally challenge the Canadian position in a court. In large part, the 
lack of persistent challenge may be because the chief opponent to the 
Canadian position, and the one most likely to initiate a challenge,41 is 
the  United  States  and  the  1988  Executive  Agreement  mentioned  above  
(in section II. on “The Increasing Importance of the Arctic”) negates 
any need for challenge. As the Agreement is without prejudice to the 
position of either nation, respecting the Agreement will not harm any 
future position taken, and in general only ice breakers can navigate the 
Passage meaning that commercial shipping is merely a growing poten-
tial and not yet a reality, there has been no need to revisit the dispute 
over the status of the Northwest Passage.42 However, with the physical 
changes to the Passage and the renewed interest in using the Passage, it 
is no longer clear that the dispute can remain buried.
38    J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, United States Responses to Excessive 
Maritime Claims, 2d ed. (The Hague: Matinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996) 339.
39  UNCLOS, supra  note  32  art.  38(2).
40  Also noted by Huebert, “The Shipping News Part II” supra note 10 at 300.
41  Huebert, “The Shipping News Part II” supra note 10 at 305.
42  Can. T.S. supra note 11. Huebert, “Climate Change” supra note 7 at 91.
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VI. THE CANADIAN ARGUMENT: CONVENTIONAL AND 
CUSTOMARY LAW
 
Assessing the relative strength of the Canadian and American positions 
taken in the dispute over the Northwest Passage is complicated. Cer-
tainly,  as  Canada  ratified  the  United  Nations’  Convention  on  the  Law  
of the Sea in 2003, the provisions of that Convention govern Canada 
on the international stage. However, customary law must also be exam-
ined when looking at the status of the Northwest Passage. This is so for 
two  reasons;;  the  first  is  that  the  provisions  of  UNCLOS  have  not  fully  
passed into customary law. As such, non-parties to UNCLOS, like the 
United States, are not bound by its provisions. Secondly, UNCLOS is an 
umbrella convention and its provisions are worded very generally. The 
lack  of  specificity  of  some  provisions  results  in  a  continued  reliance  on  
customary law interpretations. However, as Canada is a party to UNC-
LOS, the treaty provisions are the logical place to begin an examination 
of the validity of its position over the Northwest Passage in international 
law. 
The Canadian assertion of historic rights presents an immediate 
problem in attempting to settle the status of the Northwest Passage un-
der UNCLOS. Although UNCLOS refers to historic rights, the treaty 
provides  no  definition.  Article  35  of  the  treaty  says  that  nothing  in  Part  
III, the part governing international straits, affects any areas of inter-
nal waters except where straight baselines have enclosed waters not 
previously internal. What this means is, if Canada has historic title to 
the Northwest Passage, its sovereignty over the waters is complete and 
unaffected by the transit rights granted in Part III of UNCLOS. Ab-
sent   governing   definitions   in  UNCLOS,   it   is   customary   international  
law which must provide the analytical framework to Canada’s claims 
to historic title. 
The requirements to establish historic rights are reasonably straight-
forward. A state must show that it has exercised sovereignty over the 
area in question for a long period of time with the acquiescence of other 
states.43 However, under customary law, it also (at one time) appeared 
that a state could consolidate its title to marine areas using a combina-
43  Donat Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  1988)  §  6  [Canada’s Arctic Waters]. R. Douglas 
Brubaker, “Straits in the Russian Arctic” (2001) 32 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 263 at 266.
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tion of baselines supported by history. The result of such a consolidation 
would be to make the waters internal.44 If this dual possibility, historic 
title or consolidated title, did exist under customary law, there was a 
possibility  that  Canada,  by  enacting  baselines  in  1986,  unquestionably  
made the waters internal before ratifying UNCLOS and so, the provi-
sions of Part III would be inapplicable.
Based upon his assessment of the criteria for historic title, a leading 
Canadian expert, Donat Pharand, concluded that the Canadian claim to 
historic title was problematic.45 Rob Huebert, another Canadian expert 
on Arctic matters, is even less convinced by Canada’s claims to historic 
title than Pharand. Five years ago, Huebert asserted that, “[w]e know 
darn well the internal-water argument doesn’t hold.”46 He reiterated this 
position in a 2001 article, this time relying on Pharand’s assertion that 
the historic waters argument is weak.47
However, contrary to the pessimistic position of Huebert, Pharand 
concluded that under customary law, the option of consolidating title to a 
marine area by using history to support the positioning of baselines was 
available.48 On his reading of customary law, Pharand determined that 
such a consolidation would result in the waters becoming internal with 
no right of passage.49 Based upon his examination of Canada’s history, 
the position of the Arctic baselines and his understanding of customary 
international law, Pharand determined that Canada’s Arctic baselines 
were valid and that the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago were 
made  internal  in  1986.50 Contrary to his assessment of customary law, 
Pharand did admit that under the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
UNCLOS, it was possible that such a consolidation of title might result 
in waters having the associated rights only of territorial waters.51 As 
44  Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 32, Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, 
supra  note  43  §  9.5.
45  Pharand, Canada’s Arcitc Waters, supra  note  43  §  8.3  (pg.  125).
46  Mitchell, supra note 13 at 5.
47  Huebert, “Climate Change” supra  note  7  at  89.
48    Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra  note  43  at  §  9.5.
49  Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra  note  43  at  §  5.2  (pg.  93).
50  Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra  note  43  at  §  11.  Donat  Pharand,  
“Canada’s  Sovereignty  over  the  newly  enclosed  Arctic  Waters”  (1987)  25  Can.  Y.Bk.  
Int’l L. 325 at 329 [Canada’s Sovereignty].
51  Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra  note  43  at  §  5.2  (pg.  93).
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Canada, at a minimum, consolidated title under customary law, the wa-
ters were made internal. Had it been done under UNCLOS, Canada may 
have been limited to the claim that the waters were subject to the same 
rules which govern territorial waters.
However, Pharand’s position is problematic, as is the fact that some 
have relied on his conclusions. For instance, the legal position of Cana-
da has changed since Pharand’s assessment. Canada, as a party to UNC-
LOS, is now only able to assert rules of customary law, upon which Pha-
rand’s  analysis  is  built,  against  non-­party  states.  As  against  the  148  other  
parties to UNCLOS, Canada is bound by the provisions of that treaty. 
Further,  as  Canada  had  signed  the  treaty  in  1982,  it  is  unclear  whether  
the baseline legislation that Canada enacted could have resulted in a 
legal position inconsistent with what is permissible under UNCLOS.52 
More problematic is that Pharand’s argument—that waters subject to 
consolidation of title, based on baselines and history, are internal—has 
not been accepted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a correct 
statement of customary international law. 
Pharand submitted that the majority of the Court was incorrect in 
not holding that historic title and consolidation of title both have the 
result of making waters internal in the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf 
Case.53 Given the disagreement between the Arctic expert and the World 
Court, the question must be asked: which is the more correct statement 
of international law?
VII. CUSTOMARY LAW & CANADA:  
WHO TO FOLLOW? 
The special expertise of academic writers in international law, such as 
Pharand, has been recognized in the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice,54 which permits the Court to consult the teachings of highly 
qualified  publicists  as  a  subsidiary  means  for  determining  the  rules  of  in-
ternational  law.  As  such,  there  is  some  reason  to  give  significant  weight  
52  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,  Can.  T.S.  1980  No.  37,  art.  18.
53  Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra note 43 at pg. 126 n. 16.
54  Statute of the International Court of Justice. United Nations, online: <http://www.
icj-­cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm>  art.  38(1)(d).
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to Pharand’s conclusions. His conclusions are also appealing from the 
point of view of one arguing for Canadian sovereignty. This is because 
his conclusions support Canada’s assertion that the waters of the Ar-
chipelago are internal. However, there exists greater reason to favour 
the statements of the International Court of Justice, when attempting to 
determine applicable customary international law. 
To  begin  with,  Article  38(1)(d)  of   the  Statute of the International 
Court of Justice states that academic writers may be consulted by the 
Court in order that the Court be able to determine the rules of Interna-
tional Law. Thus, the article which recognizes the expertise of academ-
ics  still  gives  preference  to  the  Court  as  the  final  arbiter  of  the  content  of  
the rules of international law. Further, as the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice sets out; 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law;
c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
Based  upon  Article  38,  it  is  clear  that  the  role  of  the  ICJ  is  to  declare  
the content of customary law based upon evidence presented by parties, 
not to formulate the content of customary international law. Granted 
that  the  distinction  between  declaration  and  formulation  is  difficult  and,  
and that the ICJ’s decisions are only binding between the parties and in 
respect of that particular case;55 the provisions must give a strong reason 
to take dicta of the ICJ as persuasive evidence of the content of custom-
ary international law. 
Another major rationale for giving effect to the opinions of the ICJ 
is that the Court is the principle judicial organ of the United Nations,56 
which now has 191 members, all of whom are parties to the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice.57 The broad membership of the UN, 
and by extension the Court, confers upon its chief judicial organ a cer-
55 Ibid, art. 59.
56  Ibid, art. 1. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7 
art. 92 [Charter].
57  Charter, ibid art. 93.
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tain inherent legitimacy. In addition to this inherent legitimacy, the ICJ 
is composed of legal experts. Members of the court must be persons 
who  are  possessed  of  the  qualifications  necessary  to  achieve  judicial  of-
fice  in  their  home  state  or  have  recognized  competence  in  international  
law.58 Finally, decisions of the ICJ are made after full submissions and 
argument by parties to a dispute, after the collection of evidence and, 
if necessary, with the assistance of experts.59 This procedure provides 
a broad range of sources from which the content of customary interna-
tional  law  may  be  determined.  Perhaps  most  significantly,  customary  in-
ternational law is derived from state practice, and it is state parties who 
present evidence to the Court. As a result of this, the Court is in a unique 
position to be able to examine and make authoritative pronouncements 
upon the content of customary international law. As such, there exists 
strong incentive to ask what the ICJ has said is required to prove historic 
title and what the result of a consolidation of title by the use of baselines 
might be. If the opinions of the Court contradict the views of a particular 
expert,  there  is  cause  to  tailor  legal  arguments  to  fit  the  opinions  of  the  
Court.
Three cases must be examined in attempting to discern the opinions 
of  the  ICJ  regarding  historic  waters.  The  first  most  detailed  examination  
was done in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. In deciding that case, the 
Court made some important pronouncements on historic waters. First, it 
provided  a  definition  of  historic  waters  that  states;;  
By “historic waters” are usually meant waters which are treated as 
internal waters but which would not have that character were it not 
for the existence of an historic title.60  
The Court then asserted that a claim to historic rights was a deroga-
tion from general international law.61 As historic waters represent a de-
parture from general rules of law, it is assumed such claims will import 
a special burden of proof on the claimant.62 The Court, in its analysis, 
then subsumed the discussion of historic rights into the criteria for as-
58    Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 54 art. 2.
59 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 54, arts. 42, 43, 50 & 51.
60  Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 32 at 130.
61  Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 32 at 130.
62  Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra  note  43  at  §  6.6.
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sessing the validity of baselines. It found that the history of Norway 
supported the chosen baselines and that the waters enclosed by the lines 
were internal.63
Following the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, the Court examined his-
toric rights in the Continental Shelf Delimitation Between Tunisia and 
Libya,64 and the Maritime Boundary Delimitation Between El Salvador 
and Honduras (Nicaragua intervening).65 The cases are important, as 
the majority judgements of the Court in these cases alter the law re-
garding historic rights and consolidation of title set out in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case.
In the Tunisia/Libya Case, a majority of the Court stated that there 
was  no  single  régime  governing  a  finding  of  historic  title,  only  particular  
régimes for each recognized case of historic title66 (it was this statement 
to  which  Pharand  objected  in  his  1988  treatise).67 The régimes to which 
the Court referred were: a régime based upon acquisition and occupa-
tion and a régime based upon the existence of rights “ipso facto and ab 
initio.”68 By this, the majority of the ICJ seems to have meant that, under 
customary international law, rights over historic waters may be akin to 
those which arise when waters are internal or, they may be limited to the 
rights enjoyed over territorial waters.69  In spite of the criticism of Pha-
rand and the dissents of certain members of the Court (notably Judge 
Oda with whose analysis Pharand agreed)70 a majority of the Court re-
iterated this statement of the law regarding historic title in the 1992 El 
Salvador/Honduras Case.71 Oddly, the Court in the El Salvador/Hondu-
ras Case  also  quoted  the  definition  of  historic  waters  from  the  Fisher-
63  Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 32 at 142.
64  Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 
[Tunisia/Libya],  [1982]  I.C.J.  Rep.  18.
65  Land,  Island  and  Maritime  Frontier  Dispute  (El  Salvador/Honduras:  Nicaragua  
intervening) [El Salvador/Honduras], [1992] I.C.J. Rep. 351.
66  Tunisia/Libya, supra note 64 at 74.
67  Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra note 43 at 126, n. 16.
68    Tunisia/Libya, supra note 64 at 74.
69  Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra note  43  at  §  5.2  (pg.  93)  read  with  pg.  
126 n. 16.
70  Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra note 43 at 126, n. 16.
71  El Salvador/Honduras, supra note  65  at  589.
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ies Jurisdiction Case,  indicating  that  the  definitional  aspect  of  that  case  
which refers to historic waters as internal remains good law.72
In spite of the position which the ICJ has articulated a question re-
mains regarding the weight to be given to the analyses of the law gov-
erning historic waters contained in the Tunisia/Libya Case and the El 
Salvador/Honduras Case. In the Tunisia/Libya Case, the court found it 
unnecessary to make a determination regarding Tunisia’s claim to his-
toric title and,73 as a result, the statements made by the majority of the 
ICJ may be taken as obiter  and  dismissed  (as  Pharand  argued  in  1988).74 
However, the statements were reiterated in the El Salvador/Honduras 
Case. In that case, the historic status of the Bay of Fonseca was not in is-
sue – both parties agreed it was an historic bay.75 However, the Court did 
find  it  necessary  to  undertake  an  examination  of  the  particular  régime  
which governed the Bay of Fonseca.76  As  a  part  of  the  final  result  did  
depend upon that examination, it appears that the “particular régimes” 
comments may no longer simply be dismissed as obiter and instead, 
must be taken as part of the content of customary international law. 
Therefore, under current customary law, if Canada can show that 
the waters of the Arctic Archipelago are historical internal waters, then 
Canada is entitled to treat the waters of the Arctic, including the North-
west Passage as internal. If Canada is only able to show that the waters 
were made internal by a combination of baselines supported by his-
tory, then potential user states likely have a right to innocent passage. 
The situation is the same under UNCLOS, i.e. if the waters were made 
internal be virtue of legitimate baselines, the right of innocent passage 
survives.77 
72  El Salvador/Honduras, supra note  65  at  588.
73  Tunisia/Libya, supra note 64 at 76. 
74  Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra note 43 at 126 n. 16.
75  El Salvador/Honduras, supra note  65  at  588.
76  El Salvador/Honduras, supra note  65  at  588-­89.
77  UNCLOS, supra note 32 art. 7. 
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VIII. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE 
CANADIAN POSITION
 
Assuming this is a correct statement of current international law govern-
ing historic waters, the question to be answered is whether Canada can 
claim historic rights over the waters of the Arctic Archipelago in gen-
eral  and  the  Northwest  Passage  in  particular.  As  noted  above,  in  1988,  
Pharand found that the answer was no. However, since that time, the 
Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her 
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada and the Inuvialuit Final Agree-
ment have come into effect. As such, it is worth asking whether this 
alters the strength of Canada’s claims. It has been noted that the ICJ has 
found that the historic presence of nomadic peoples can support a state’s 
claim to historic title.78 Therefore, although the Inuit are not nomadic,79 
the presence of the Inuit as original peoples and their agreements with 
Canada may have an impact.
To reiterate the requirements, in order to support a claim of historic 
title, Canada, as the claimant state must show that it has exercised ex-
clusive authority, for a long period of time with the acquiescence of 
other states. It is suggested that in examining the factors necessary for a 
finding  of  historic  title,  that  both  the  words  and  actions  of  the  claimant  
state and any opposing state are important. While it is unclear whether 
actions speak louder than words (or vice versa), if the actions of a state 
contradict a protest, it may be found to lessen, or overcome, the impact 
of those words.
In terms of an exclusive exercise of authority over a long period 
of time, Canada can show a long, but generally inconsistent history of 
exercising authority.80 However, as Pharand noted, if the laws and regu-
lations of the coastal state are never challenged, very little is required 
to maintain effective and exclusive control.81  Further, in the particular 
context of the Canadian Arctic, it is worth questioning how high the de-
gree of control exercised by Canada must be. As Canada has never sug-
78    Arcticnet, supra  note  18.
79  Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, The Inuit of Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, 1995) 6 [Inuit Tapirisat].
80    See the discussion in Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra note  43  at  §  8.
81    Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra note 43 at §  6.1.
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gested that it is interested in closing the waters of the Passage entirely, 
and is simply concerned that users conform to Canadian-set shipping 
standards,82 one would only expect the enforcement of measures which 
are directed to that end.
In terms of the degree of challenge to Canadian laws, it is worth not-
ing that there have been few challenges to Canadian sovereignty over 
the Northwest Passage. In fact, there has, to date, been very little use of 
the Northwest Passage at all (only ninety-nine full transits in 101 years, 
thirty-­eight  of  which  were  by  Canadian  flagged  ships).83 Because of the 
minimal use which has been made of the Northwest Passage, it is sub-
mitted that Canada had no need to initiate a constant, comprehensive 
strategy to assert its sovereignty. 
In the case of Canada’s Arctic, what measures were, and are being, 
undertaken? From 1906-1911, Canada applied whaling legislation to 
ships operating in at least part of the claimed area,84 in addition, in 1913, 
a Canadian expedition was sent to patrol the waters of the Arctic in order 
to explore and to enforce Canadian Customs and Fishing Regulations 
against American whalers.85 After World War I ended, an annual Arctic 
patrol  was  instituted  in  order  to  protect  and  affirm  Canada’s  sovereignty.  
As part of this greater show of control, the RCMP was established as a 
permanent presence in important areas to consolidate title over the is-
lands and supervise adjacent waters. Canada also exercised control over 
various supply missions undertaken by American ships after the Second 
World War.86 More recently, Canada enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Protection Act (AWPPA) in 1970. The provisions of the AWPPA, which 
remains in force, are applied to ships entering Arctic waters.87 NOR-
82    Huebert, “Climate Change” supra note 7 at 93, Douglas M. Johnston, “The 
Northwest Passage Revisited” (2002) 33 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 145 at 149. See also 
the preamble to the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act,  R.S.C.  1985,  c.  A-­12.
83    Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, supra note 3, Appendix F. A further 
indication of minimal use can be seen in the terms of sale for the Churchill Port 
facility. The port was so little used that in 1997, it was sold for a mere $10 (ten). 
Annandale, supra note 5.
84    Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra note  43  at  §  8.2  (pp.  117-­119).
85    Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra note  43  at  §  8.2  (pg.  120).
86    Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra note  43  at  §  8.2  (pp.  120-­121).
87    Brubaker, supra note 43 at 276-77. Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act, supra 
note  82  s.  4(1).
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DREG, a reporting system, is also available to ships entering Canadian 
Arctic Waters. This system is used to facilitate rescues and assistance 
should either be required (the system is however voluntary).88 How-
ever, there are problems with Canada’s assertions that it has had, and 
continues to have, control over the Artic. As late as 2003, Canada did 
not require a ship entering Arctic waters to give ninety-six hours notice, 
as was necessary for ships entering southern waters.89  This  notification  
requirement is now in place for Arctic waters as well.90 Does this con-
stitute  a  sufficient  exercise  of  control  over  a  sufficiently  long  period  to  
meet  the  first  two  of  the  criteria  for  historic  title?  Given  the  minimal  use  
of the waters and the lack of desire to exclude all foreign vessels, the 
answer may very well be yes.
Pharand did identify a further factor which he believed harmed the 
Canadian claim; the fact that British and Canadian explorers did not spe-
cifically  claim  the  waters  of  the  Archipelago  when  claiming  the  land.91 
This failure however, may no longer be a factor. If recognition is given 
to the presence of original peoples, the Canadian claim to historic title in 
the Arctic is strengthened by the presence of the Inuit in the Arctic. This 
is so in particular because Canada has signed land claims agreements 
with both the Inuvialuit (Inuit of the Western Arctic) and the Inuit. Ac-
cording  to  the  terms  of  the  1984  Inuvialuit Final Agreement;
the Inuvialuit cede, release, surrender and convey all their aboriginal 
claims, rights, title and interests, whatever they may be, in and to 
the Northwest Territories and Yukon Territory and adjacent offshore 
areas, not forming part of the Northwest Territories or Yukon 
Territory, within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Canada.92 
Similarly, in the 1993 Agreement Between the Inuit and Canada, the 
Inuit;
88    NORDREG website. Nordreg, online: <http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/cen-arc/mcts-
sctm/mcts-­services/vtrarctic_e.htm>.
89    Huebert, “The Shipping News Part II” supra note 10 at 302.
90   See  notice  at  <http://www.notmar.gc.ca/eng/services/notmar/96hour.pdf>.
91  Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra  note  43  at  §  8.3  (pp.  122-­123).
92   Agreement  can  be  found  online  at  <http://www.ainc-­inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/inu/wesar1_
e/pdf>.  Accessed  Dec.  5,  2005.
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In  consideration  of  the  rights  and  benefits  provided  to  Inuit  by  the  
Agreement, Inuit hereby:
a) Cede, release and surrender to Her Majesty The Queen in Right of 
Canada, all their aboriginal claims, rights, title and interests, if any, 
in and to lands and waters anywhere within Canada and adjacent 
offshore areas within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Canada.93
The area covered by these two agreements stretches from 141° in 
the west to the eastern edges of the Arctic Islands and includes the wa-
ters of the Northwest Passage.94  
As a result of these Agreements, provided the Inuit subject to these 
Agreements can establish an historic presence, Canada should now be 
able to assert title by cession. Did the Inuit have an historic presence 
over the land and waters of the Arctic which should be recognized? The 
Inuit have inhabited the Arctic regions of what is now Canada for 4,000 
years. The occupation and use of the land by the Inuit covered an area 
ranging from the Mackenzie Delta in the west to the Labrador Coast in 
the East and from the southern part of Hudson Bay to the High Arctic 
Islands in the North. Further, until the signing of the land claims agree-
ments, the Inuit had never signed any treaty ceding their land to Euro-
pean explorers, or earlier Canadian governments. Finally, Inuit hunting 
activities were not limited to land, or ice, but included hunting on the 
open water.95
Based upon these enumerated factors, added to the absence of non 
Inuit in the area until the arrival of English explorers in the 16th century 
it is apparent that the Inuit can prove an historic presence, which includ-
ed  use  and  occupation,  of  the  area  in  question.  By  the  terms  of  the  1984  
and 1993 Agreements, whatever rights or title that presence conferred 
are now vested in Canada and it falls to the Canadian state to assert and 
defend, and claim, that title or those rights on the international level.
The combination of Inuit rights, now vested in Canada, and the ex-
ercise of Canadian authority over the Arctic waters (which began even 
before title and rights had been ceded) strengthens the claim that Cana-
93  Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut 
Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada (1993) cl. 2.7.1.
94  See map available on the Atlas of Canada website at <http://www.atlas.gc.ca/site/
english/maps/reference/national/can_political_ereferencemap_image_view>.  
95  Inuit Tapirisat, supra note 79 at 1-3, 11.
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da, by virtue of agreement with one of its founding peoples and through 
the exercise of authority over the waters in dispute, has historic title to 
the region. The question is; does it go far enough? 
Rather than answer this question directly, it is useful to examine the 
final  requirement  for  a  finding  of  historic  title;;  the  acquiescence  of  other  
states. As both the United States and the European Union have protested 
Canadian assertions of sovereignty to the Arctic,96 it might be expected 
that  Canada  can  not  demonstrate  sufficient  acquiescence  and  that,  there-
fore, the relative strength and longevity of any exercise of sovereignty 
is moot. However, it must be asked whether the actions of the United 
States or European Union members contradict the statements of oppo-
sition which they have made, weakening the protests. Further, it may 
be useful to ask whether there are indications of acquiescence which 
support Canadian assertions of sovereignty and which would give an 
indication that the addition of Inuit rights to the Canadian claim make 
Canada capable of supporting the argument of historic title. 
Looking  first  at   the  practice  of   the  United  States,   it  has   twice  en-
gaged in actions that challenge Canadian claims to sovereignty over the 
Northwest  Passage.  The  first  challenge  came  in  1970  after  the  Humble  
Oil tanker, the Manhattan, traversed the Northwest Passage. The of-
ficial  challenge  came  in  response  to  the  enactment  of  the  AWPPA  and  
the extension of Canada’s territorial sea out to 12M as a response to 
the tanker’s journey.97The   second   challenge   came   in   1985,  when   the  
United States Coast Guard Ice Breaker, Polar Sea, transited the Passage 
without asking Canadian permission. These two actions were based on 
the United States’ government position that the waters of the Northwest 
Passage were, in 1969-70 terms, high seas98 or are, in post-UNCLOS 
terms, a strait used for international navigation.99 
96  Huebert, “Climate Change” supra note 7 at 90.
97  Donat Pharand, The Northwest Passage; Arctic Straits, vol. 7 (Dordrecht: 
Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  1984)  107  [International Straits], Donald R. Rothwell, 
“The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A reassessment” (1993) 26 Cornell 
Int’l L. J. 331 at 339-341.
98    Department of State, “Memorandum for Mr. Kissinger” (March 12, 1970) 3, 
available  online  at:  <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52576.pdf>.
99  Huebert, “Climate Change” supra note 7 at 90, Steven R. Ritchey (Lt. Col. 
USAF), “The Northwest Passage: Troubled Waters for United States-Canada 
Relations”  (National  War  College,  1987)  17,  available  online:  <http://www.ndu.edu/
library/n3/SSP-­87-­129.pdf>.  
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However, the strength of the American position has been under-
mined by the actions, or inactions, which it has taken both in regard to 
its challenges, and in the aftermath of those challenges. First, it is neces-
sary to note that, although the United States did not request Canadian 
permission to send the Manhattan or the Polar Sea through the Pas-
sage, in both cases, there was Canadian involvement or acquiescence in 
the transits.100 While it might be suggested that such involvement was 
permitted as a sop to an ally’s wounded pride, if the United States was 
strongly committed to the position that the waters of the Northwest Pas-
sage are free to use by anyone, one would have expected them to settle 
any hurt feelings after the fact and so avoid compromising their position 
by accepting the involvement of the Canadian state. Further, after the 
transits by the Manhattan and the Polar Sea, Canada took legislative 
measures in response to the perceived threat to Canadian Arctic sov-
ereignty. In response to the legislative actions of Canada, in 1970 the 
enactment of the AWPPA and the extension of Canada’s territorial sea 
to  12M  and  in  1985  the  establishment  of  baselines,  the  United  States  did  
virtually, nothing. 
In 1970, the response of the United States to Canadian legislative 
actions was a protest Note, but the Note was not followed by legal ac-
tion.  This  is  of  some  significance  as  the  reservation  with  which  Canada  
entered to the jurisdiction of the ICJ related only to the AWPPA, and not 
to the extension of Canada’s territorial sea. Yet in spite of this limit on 
Canada’s reservation, the United States did not follow up on its protest 
by initiating a case before the ICJ.101 This lack of response was in spite 
of the fact that a memo to Henry Kissinger, then holding the position of 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, stated that Ca-
nadian acts to assert sovereignty in the Arctic, “are critical for national 
100  Pharand, International Straits, supra note 97 at 47, Ritchey, ibid 7, although, as 
Ritchey points out, the permission which was granted had not been sought. Arctic 
Marine Transport Workshop, supra note 3 at A-22.
101  Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra note  43  at  §  8.3  (pg.  124).  The  United  
States’ protest Note to Canada pointed out that the Canadian declaration did not 
preclude Canada from voluntarily submitting the dispute to the ICJ, but did not 
actually request that Canada do so. The Note stated that the US was willing to accept 
the 12M limit but, only as part of an international treaty. The Canadian declaration of 
a 12M limit did not meet this requirement but, the US did not pursue an international 
legal remedy before the Court. House of Commons Debates, 006 (April 15, 1970) 
(Appendix “A”) 5923 at 5924.
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security interests and seriously degrade the entire United States law of 
the sea posture on which military mobility depends.”102 
In the wake of the transit of the Polar Sea, the United States also took 
action which had the potential effect of weakening its stated position. 
In  1988,  the  United  States  and  Canada  signed  an  Executive  Agreement  
which provided that United States ice breakers would only transit the 
Northwest Passage with Canada’s prior consent.103 It has been suggested 
that the Agreement provides limited protection for Canada as it only 
regulates passage by ice breakers however,104 even today, the Northwest 
Passages is only navigable by ice breakers or ice strengthened ships and 
so  this  restriction  is  really  just  a  reflection  of  functional  reality.  
By contrast, the United States concession to the consent requirement 
cannot be so easily reasoned away.  The United States asserted that its 
ships  could  freely  transit  the  Northwest  Passage.  As  a  reflection  of  that,  
it sent the Polar Sea through without asking permission. Three years 
later, the United States signed an Agreement which required that it seek 
permission from Canada before sending its icebreakers through the Pas-
sage. It is unlikely this was done in anticipation that the United States 
would be making frequent use of the Passage; between the transits of 
the Manhattan and the Polar Sea, there were no American transits of the 
Passage. As a result, it cannot be supposed that this was a measure de-
signed  to  avoid  likely  future  conflict.  Further,  the  Agreement  was  basi-
cally a “win” for Canada. Although the Agreement states that it is with-
out prejudice to the positions of the parties,105 it gives Canada exactly 
what it sought; a requirement that the United States obtain permission 
before using the Passage.106  Clause  3  of  the  Agreement  is  a  clear  reflec-
tion   that   the  United  States  retreated  significantly  from  its  stated  posi-
tion that the waters were an international strait, “The Government of 
the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within 
102  Memorandum for Mr. Kissinger, supra  note  98  at  4.
103  Can. T.S. supra note 11.
104  Rothwell, supra note 95 at 346. Elizabeth B. Elliot-Meisel, “Still Unresolved 
after  fifty  years;;  the  Northwest  Passage  in  Canadian-­American  relations,  1946-­1998”  
(1999)  29  Amer.  Rev.  Can.  St.  407  at  418.
105  Can. T.S. supra note 11.
106  Elliot-Meisel, supra note  104  at  418.
THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE . . . 231 
waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the 
consent of the Government of Canada.”107 
In addition to this series of actions and inactions, by the United 
States in response to Canadian assertions of sovereignty, must be add-
ed the fact that, although the United States and the European Union 
have protested the claims of Canadian Arctic sovereignty,108 most ships 
which operate in the Arctic do so in compliance with Canadian law.109 
Additionally, the United States has apparently accepted that Canadian 
laws apply to American commercial vessels.110 Finally, since the end of 
the Cold War, eco-tourist voyages to the Arctic have become popular 
and, when such trips take place in the Canadian Arctic, it is done with 
Canadian permission.111
However, this discussion represents only one third of the argument. 
While it seems that there is some strength to the Canadian assertion that 
the waters of the Passage are internal by virtue of historic title, it must 
be considered whether there is greater validity to the American argu-
ment that the waters of the Passage form an international strait. As the 
United States is not a party to UNCLOS, it seems logical to begin this 
discussion with the position at customary law.
IX. THE AMERICAN ARGUMENT
The customary law governing international straits was set out by the 
International Court of Justice in the 1949 Corfu Channel Case. In that 
case, the ICJ determined that there was both a geographic and a func-
tional requirement to be met in establishing that a strait is an interna-
tional strait. Geographically the strait must connect one part of the high 
seas with another part of the high seas.112  Functionally, which the Court 
considered the less important of the two requirements, the strait must be 
useful for international navigation.113 In determining utility, the Court 
107  Can. T.S. supra note 11.
108    Huebert, “Climate Change” supra note 7 at 90. 
109  Brubaker, supra note 43 at 279.
110  Brubaker, supra note 43 at 277.
111  Huebert, “Climate Change” supra note  7  at  87.
112  Corfu Channel Case (Merits),  [1949]  I.C.J.  Rep.  4  at  28.
113  Ibid.
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accepted  evidence  of  high  use  (2,884  ships)  over  a  short  period  of  time  
(one  year,  nine  months)  representing  a  fair  number  of  flags  (seven).114 
If it is established under customary law that a strait is used for interna-
tional navigation, innocent passage rights apply.115
Under UNCLOS, the geographic requirement has been extended. 
A strait may be an international strait if it connects one part of the high 
seas or an EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) with another part of the 
high seas or an EEZ.116 If this geographic requirement is met, and the 
strait is used for international navigation, then parties to UNCLOS en-
joy “transit rights” through the strait.117  As  there  is  no  definition  in  UN-
CLOS, the test for an international strait is the same as that articulated 
in the Corfu Channel Case.118 The régime of transit rights created by 
UNLCOS is friendlier to foreign shipping than that of innocent pas-
sage. Transit rights cannot be hampered by the coastal states, and it is 
generally accepted international standards to which a ship is required to 
conform, by contrast, coastal states may enact laws relating to innocent 
passage in some circumstances (generally for the safety of shipping, the 
security of the coastal state and environmental protection).119
In applying the above criteria to the Northwest Passage, it becomes 
apparent that proving the assertion that the waters of the Northwest Pas-
sage  form  an  international  strait  is  subject  to  considerable  difficulties.  It  
is  generally  accepted  that  the  Northwest  Passage  satisfies  the  geograph-
ic requirement.120 As the ICJ characterized this geographic requirement 
as the more important of the two,121 this provides a boost to claims the 
Passage is an international strait. However, it seems unlikely that the 
Northwest  Passage  would  meet  the  functional  definition  of  an  interna-
tional strait.
While it has been suggested that the functional requirement will 
be lessened when applied to the ice-choked waters of the Northwest 
114  Ibid 29.
115  Ibid 28.
116  UNCLOS, supra note 32 art. 37.
117  UNCLOS, supra note  32  art.  38.
118    Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, supra  note  43  at  §  14.1  (pg.  216).
119  UNCLOS, supra note 32 arts. 44, 39 and 21.
120  Pharand, International Straits, supra note 97 at 99, Rothwell, supra note 97 at 
353-54.
121  Corfu Channel Case, supra note  112  at  28.
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Passage,122 there has been no suggestion that this requirement will be 
removed in its entirety. A reduction in the functional requirement is sup-
ported by simple reality. Clearly, no one would require that the Passage 
be navigated nearly 3,000 times over a two-year period in order to qual-
ify as an international strait. Such a requirement would be impossible, 
and it is unlikely that international law would be so restrictively applied. 
What is unclear is the degree of use which might be required to meet 
the functional requirement.123  In  examining  the  three  factors  identified  
by  the  ICJ  as  relevant,  number  of  flags,  period  of  time,  and  actual  tran-
sits, it still seems that the Northwest Passage is unlikely to meet even a 
reduced functional requirement.
It must be conceded that the ships which have made the transit rep-
resent  a   reasonably  high  number  of  flags.   Indeed,  ships  carrying  sev-
enteen  different  flags  have  made  the  transit.124 However, even with this 
relatively  high  number  of  flags,  it  is  extremely  doubtful  that  a  Passage  
which has been transited fewer than 100 times in more than 100 years 
could be characterized as a strait that is being used for international 
navigation (to paraphrase the Corfu Channel Case).125 The same would 
apply to an examination under UNCLOS. Although the United States 
asserts that potential use of a strait may be considered in determining 
whether a particular strait is international, it is generally agreed that 
only actual use is relevant.126 Thus, in asking whether the Northwest 
Passage is a strait used for international navigation, it is only the ninety-
nine transits which have so far been completed, which may form part of 
the inquiry.
Finally, in assessing the overall strength of the United States posi-
tion that the Passage is a strait used for international navigation, and 
thus subject to transit rights, it is useful to remember that the United 
States is not a party to UNCLOS. The regime of transit rights which the 
United States claims as a right is a creation, entirely, of UNCLOS. As it 
is not clear this regime has been accepted as forming a part of custom-
122  Rothwell, supra note 97 at 354-55.
123  Huebert, “The Shipping News Part II” supra note 10 at 301. 
124  Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, supra note 3 at Appendix F.
125  Corfu Channel Case, supra note  112  at  28.  See  also  Rothwell,  supra note 97 at 
148.
126  Pharand, International Straits, supra note 97 at 102, Rothwell, supra note 97 at 
354-55, Brubaker, supra note 43 at 267.
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ary international law at this time,127 even if the United States was correct 
and the Northwest Passage is a strait used for international navigation, 
they could, as non parties to the treaty, at best claim innocent passage 
rights through the Passage.128 
X. COMPARING THE LEGAL POSITIONS 
This examination of current law and practice shows that, while the Ca-
nadian position that the waters are historical internal waters is (at best) 
supportable on the basis of ceded original people’s title and (at worst) 
problematic, the United States position on the subject is (at best) opti-
mistic and (at worst) grounded in wishful thinking. Given that there are 
problems with the legal positions of both parties, it is unlikely that either 
the United States or Canada will choose to resort to legal process to set-
tle this dispute.129  The  dispute  involves  very  significant  concerns.  Each  
party has articulated a position which it considers necessary to assure its 
security and neither is likely to permit a loss of control over a process 
that will determine rights which will impact such vital interests. Further, 
the last time the two countries resorted to international legal process (the 
Gulf  of  Maine  arbitration)  neither  was  satisfied  with  the  outcome.130
This examination of Canadian and American assertions, set against 
current legal requirements and practice, as opposed to the statements of 
other nations, indicates that Pharand may have been too quick to dismiss 
the possibility that Canada could prove historic title to the waters of the 
Arctic. Although it is not clear that Canada could prove such title, it is 
not clear that such a claim is doomed to failure from the outset. Even if 
Canada is unable to support a claim to historic title, it is possible that, 
at a minimum, the current situation admits that the waters of the Pas-
sage  were  made   internal  by  virtue  of   the  1985-­86  baselines  and   that,  
the strength of UNCLOS Article 234 permits Canada to restrict the in-
127  Brubaker, supra  note  43  at  268.
128    Corfu Channel Case, supra  note  112  at  28.
129  Andrea Charron, “The Northwest Passage Shipping Channel; Sovereignty First 
and Foremost and Sovereignty to the Side” (2005) 7 J. of Mil. & Strat. Stud. 1 at 
3-4. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, online: <http://www.jmss.org/2005/
summer/articles/charron.pdf>.
130  Rothwell, supra note  97  at  368.
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nocent  passage  rights  which  apply  to  user  states.  This  is  the  final  ques-
tion which must be examined when assessing the current status of the 
Northwest Passage in international law.
XI. A THIRD ALTERNATIVE 
Before asserting that recent practice suggests that other states are tacitly 
admitting Canadian historic title, it must be pointed out that, if the base-
lines  established  in  1985-­86  are  valid,  the  waters  of  the  Canadian  Arctic  
Archipelago are internal (although subject to rights of innocent pas-
sage). This is so by virtue of both customary law (as examined above) 
and  by  virtue  of  Article  8(2)  of  UNCLOS.  Although  Canada’s  baselines  
were protested,131  subsequent  state  practice,  if  it  is  not  sufficient  to  show  
acquiescence  to  historic  title,  should  be  sufficient  to  overcome  the  ef-
fects of the protests to the baselines. No legal challenge has been raised 
against the baselines and foreign vessels, as indicated above, generally 
operate in compliance with Canadian laws.132 Further, academic com-
mentary has suggested that, based on the factors enumerated in the Fish-
eries Jurisdiction Case,  and  codified  in  UNCLOS  Article  7,  the  base-
lines  are  justifiable.133
A brief discussion of the factors enumerated in the Fisheries Juris-
diction Case  and  in  UNCLOS  will  suffice  to  assess  Canada’s  baselines.  
Essentially, baselines can be used where a coastline is deeply indented 
or if there is a fringe of islands in the immediate vicinity. A baseline 
must not depart to an appreciable extent from the direction of the coast 
and  the  sea  areas  within  the  baselines  must  be  sufficiently  closely  linked  
to the nearby land to be subject to the regime of internal waters. In draw-
ing the baselines, account may be taken of interests particular to the 
region concerned as evidenced by long usage.134
In terms of the Canadian Arctic, the baselines which have been es-
tablished around the outer edge of the Arctic islands are unquestion-
131  Rothwell, supra note 97 at 345.
132  Brubaker, supra note 43 at 279.
133  Pharand, “Canada’s Sovereignty” supra note 50 at 331, Rothwell supra note 97 
at 367.
134  UNCLOS, supra note 32 art. 7, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 32 at 
133,  138.
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ably  justifiable.  In  geographic  terms,  it  is  sufficient  to  point  out  that  the  
baseline regime established by Canada around the Arctic Archipelago 
must conform to the legal requirements articulated by the ICJ in the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. As such, if a coast were similar to the Nor-
wegian coast, it would be a strong indication that such a maritime area 
is properly able to be enclosed by baselines. In this connexion, it is 
worth noting that Judge McNair’s dissent in the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
Case compared the Norwegian Coast to the Canadian coast.135 If the 
similarity  was  sufficient  to  be  apparent  to  a  member  of  the  ICJ  in  1951,  
there seems little reason to doubt that such similarity can support the 
contention that the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is properly subject to a 
baseline regime today. 
In addition, the baselines which Canada has established can be sup-
ported by the presence of the Inuit and their particular interests. The 
Inuit have for centuries developed cultural practices which range over 
the area enclosed by the baselines.136 The cultural practices which they 
established over that time required that they move with the seasons.137 
Moreover, those cultural practices remain central to the Inuit today.138 
Given the importance of the enclosed area to the Inuit, the similarity with 
the Norwegian situation and the fact that, in that case, the ICJ character-
ized that type of offshore archipelago as constituting, “a whole with the 
mainland, it is the outer line of the ‘skjaergaard’ which must be taken 
into account in delimiting the belt of Norwegian territorial waters,”139 
any challenge to the Canadian delimitations is very likely to meet with 
failure. It is also worth considering that, if the waters of the Archipelago 
were simply made internal by the establishment of the baselines, there 
might be no need to insist on a formal challenge to the delimitation as, 
by  virtue  of  Article  8(2)  of  UNCLOS  a  right  of  innocent  passage  would  
apply. Such rights would permit use of the Northwest Passage by for-
eign  flagged  ships.
It is also possible that innocent passage rights in the Arctic might 
not be incompatible with Canadian needs. Innocent passage rights, as 
135  Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 32 at 169.
136  Inuit of Canada, supra note 79 at 2.
137  Inuit of Canada, supra note 79 at 6.
138    Inuit of Canada, supra note 79 at 7, 16.
139  Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note  32  at  128.
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detailed by UNCLOS Article 19, set limits on what a foreign vessel 
is permitted to do in the waters of the coastal state. Although it does 
not  specifically  require   that  a   foreign  vessel  submit   to  all   the   laws  of  
a coastal state, it may be that in ice covered waters, innocent passage 
rights  are  modified  by  the  impact  of  Article  234  (the  so-­called  Canadian  
clause).  It  has  been  suggested  that,  even  absent  ratification  of  UNCLOS  
by  Canada,  the  country  was  able  to  benefit  from  the  effects  of  Article  
234  as  it  was  a  generally  accepted  provision  even  absent  ratification.140 
As such, it is possible that the acquiescence of other states to Canadian 
laws is based, not on the strength of Canada’s historic title, but because 
Canada, by customary and conventional international law, is permit-
ted to enact more stringent pollution prevention measures in its arctic 
waters, restricting the rights of innocent passage which user states oth-
erwise enjoy.141 
Canada has asserted that the waters are historical internal waters 
because such a position was deemed necessary to protect Canadian sov-
ereignty and security. However, it has never been the Canadian position 
that they would not permit use of the Arctic waters by foreign ships.142 
If the impact of the Canadian clause is such that innocent passage in ice 
covered areas requires compliance with stringent environmental laws 
(as opposed to “normal” rights of innocent passage which only require 
abstention from acts of wilful or serious pollution)143 it is submitted that 
such a situation would be compatible with Canadian needs. Inspections 
to ensure compliance with environmental laws added to the require-
ments for passage to be innocent (found in UNCLOS Article 19) would 
adequately protect both the Arctic environment and Canadian sover-
eignty. Therefore, it is possible that state practice is leading to a situ-
140   Ted  L.  McDorman,  “Editorial:  Canada  Ratifies  the  1982  United  Nations  
Convention on the Law of the Sea: At Last” (2004) 35 Ocean Dev. Int’l L. 103 at 
108.
141  Brubaker, supra note 43 at 269 suggested that practice was leading to the 
primacy of Article 234 for surface transits of ice covered waters.
142  See for example the statement made by Jean Chrétien, then Minister of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development, on April 16, 1970 that, “[t]he government 
wants Canadian Arctic waters to be opened up to commercial shipping.” House of 
Commons Debates,  006  (April  16,  1970)  at  5938  (Hon.  Jean  Chrétien).  The  Canadian  
position was also reported by Johnson supra note  82  at  149  and  Huebert,  “Climate  
Change” supra note 7 at 93.
143  UNCLOS, supra note 32 art. 19(2)(h).
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ation in which one article of UNCLOS, Article 234, is being read as 
modifying other provisions of the treaty, tipping the balance of rights, 
in this case, in favour of the coastal states. Indeed, this suggestion is 
compatible with the theory that state practice in the Arctic was already 
resulting in the development of a circumpolar customary law outside of 
UNCLOS.144
XII. THE STATUS QUO:  
SHOULD WE MAKE A CHANGE? 
The only remaining question is whether a negotiated settlement is pref-
erable to letting a modus vivendi develop. Canada may want to examine 
the possibility of renegotiating the Agreement with the United States 
over the Passage. Now that it is possible for ice strengthened ships, 
rather than only ice breakers, to navigate the Passage, the current Agree-
ment may no longer give adequate protection to Canadian interests. The 
likelihood of any renegotiation, when assessed in light of current con-
ditions, is however, minimal. It has been suggested recently that com-
ments by the former United States Ambassador to Canada, Paul Celluci, 
should be taken as an invitation to negotiate. Celluci, before leaving 
Canada, indicated that the United States is currently looking at eve-
rything through the terrorism prism and, as such, might be willing to 
make concessions on the Northwest Passage if it is in the United States’ 
security interests.145
Practically, such concessions are unlikely to materialize. It was ar-
gued during the Cold War that an admission that the Northwest Pas-
sage   is   internal  Canadian  waters  would  benefit  United  States  security  
by permitting the regulation, or exclusion, of Soviet ships from the Pas-
sage. This was not a strong enough argument to sway the United States 
in  1970  or  1985;;  American  leaders  considered  it  more  important  to  be  
able to freely navigate their own ships than to restrict the navigational 
144  Brubaker, supra note 43 at 279.
145  Arcticnet, supra  note  18.  See  also  Franklyn  Griffiths,  “The  Shipping  News:  
Canada’s  Arctic  Sovereignty  Not  on  Thinning  Ice”  (2003)  58  Int’l  J.  257  at  270-­
271.  Griffiths  argues  the  current  context  may  make  the  United  States  challenge  to  
Canadian sovereignty less likely.
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rights of Soviet ships in one area.146 Similarly, if the United States to-
day considers that its interests are best served by maintaining a position 
consistent with free navigation, they are unlikely to concede Canadian 
sovereignty and control over the Passage. Therefore; a legal resolution 
is unlikely as neither party will want to lose control of the process and, a 
bilateral agreement is unlikely as only one party, Canada, currently has 
a reason to upset the status quo.147
CONCLUSION
 
The question of the status of the Northwest Passage has garnered in-
creasing attention by academics, and Canadian leaders have made state-
ments asserting Canadian Arctic sovereignty generally. However, the 
reality  may  be  that  Canada’s  position  will  strengthen  if  it  delays  a  final  
determination the status of the Passage. Although it is in Canada’s inter-
est  to  alter  the  current  status  quo  with  regard  to  the  1988  Agreement  with  
the United States, it is not in Canada’s interest to do anything would will 
upset the general compliance with its laws which it currently enjoys. 
Regardless of the reasons for compliance, the effect is for Canada to 
secure the control it desires.  The longer the compliance continues, the 
more likely it becomes that compliance will be recognized as an obliga-
tion imposed by customary law. Canada should attempt to character-
ize  derogations  from  compliance  as  unjustifiable  breaches  of  customary  
law.    In  the  case  of  Canadian  allies,  like  the  United  States,  justification  
of such a breach could not even be based upon necessity, as Canada is 
unlikely to refuse passage to allied nations, especially in a situation of 
emergency. 
Given that time and the continuation of current practice can only 
strengthen Canada’s position, one can expect that while Canadian lead-
ers will continue to assert Arctic sovereignty and continue to take rea-
sonable unilateral measures to secure that sovereignty on a domestic 
level, they will do nothing to cause a reaction on the international level. 
146  Huebert, “The Shipping News Part II” supra note 10 at 305.
147  Elliot-Meisel, supra note 104 at 421. Elliot-Meisel suggests that, while Canada 
arguably has a stronger incentive to settle the dispute, a resolution is also in the 
interests of the US. For an argument that Canada is likely to maintain the status quo, 
see Charron, supra note 129 at 25. 
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Although certainty regarding the status of the Passage might be desir-
able, it is not yet an urgent issue urgency, such that should Canada risk 
spoiling the peaceful compliance it currently enjoys. 
 
